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J:BJSSIE SENERIS et al., Appellants, v. DR. GEORGE S. 
HAAS et al., Respondents. 
[1] Dismissal-Nonsuit-When Motion Granted.-A motion for 
nonsuit may properly be granted only when, disregarding con-
flicting evidence and giving plaintiff's evidence all the value to 
which it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate infer-
ence which may be drawn therefrom, the result is a determina-
tion that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to 
support a verdict for plaintiff. 
[2] Trial-Questions of Law and Fact.-The trial court is not jus-
tified in taking the case from the jury unless it can be said as 
a matter of law that no other reasonable conclusion is legally 
deducible from the evidence and that any other holding would 
be so lacking in evidentiary support that a reviewing court 
would be impelled to reverse it on appeal or the trial court 
to set it aside as a matter of law. 
[3a, 3b] Physicians-Malpractice-Nonsuit.-In an action against 
an obstetrician and an anesthesiologist for malpractice in 
alleged negligent administration of a spinal anesthetic before 
the birth of plaintiff's child, it was error to grant a nonsuit 
as to the anesthesiologist where the obstetrieian testified that 
the nerve roots had been affected by the anesthetic solution 
used and the anesthesiologist testified that the nerve roots had 
been affected below the level of his injection, since it could 
have been legitimately inferred by the jury from such evidence 
that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused from spinal 
cord damage administered between the twelfth thoracic and 
the first lumbar vertBbrae, and that a spinal anesthetic adminis-
tered in that location was not good medical practice or the 
exercise of that care expected of a practicing physician in that 
community. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 48; 
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 42. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, § 75; [2] Trial, § 125; 
[3] Physicians,§ 58; [4] Negligence,§ 150; [5, 13, 14] Negligence. 
§ 156.5; [6, 12] Negligence, § 133; [7] Negligence, § 135; [8, 10] 
Physicians, §56; [9, 11] Physicians, § 52.1; [15] Physicians, §56 
(3); [16, 22, 26] Physicians, § 56(2); [17] Hospitals, § 19; [18] 
Agency, § 231; [19] Hospitals, § 8; [20] Agency, § 62; [21] Hos-
pitals, § 20; [23] Evidence, § 459; [24, 25] Evidence, § 457; [27] 
Evidence, § 18; [28] Physicians, §55. 
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[4] Negligence--Questions of Law and Fact---Exercise of Care.-
A defendant's conduct must be gauged in relation to all the 
other material circumstances surrounding it, and if such other 
circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
questioned conduct falls within or without the bounds of ordi-
nary care, such doubt must be resolved as a matter of fact 
rather than of law. 
[lia-5c] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact- Res Ipsa Loquitur.-
Where the evidence is conflicting or subject to different infer 
ences, it is for the jury, under proper instructions, to deter· 
mine whether each of the conditions necessary to bring into 
play the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. (Disapproving 
any contrary expression in Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216. 
88 p .2d 695.) 
[6] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The conditions to be met before the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied are that the 
accident or injury must be of a kind which ordinarily does not 
occur in the absence of someone's negligence, that it must be 
caused by an agency or instrumentality in defendant's control. 
and that it must not have been due to any voluntary action 
or contribution on plaintiff's part. 
[7] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Limitations of Doctrine.-Although 
one may be in control of the instrumentality causing injury 
to another, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply 
unless it can be said, in the light of common experience, that 
the accident was more likely than not the result of defendant's 
negligence. 
[8] Physicians-Malpractice--Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In applying the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the fact that defendant may 
have superior knowledge of what occurred and that the chief 
evidence of the cause of the accident may be accessible to 
defendant but inaccessible to plaintiff is peculiarly applicable. 
as well as necessary, where a patient suffers injury while 
unconscious and in the care or custody of defendant. 
[9] !d.-Malpractice--Persons Liable.-Every defendant in whose 
custody plaintiff patient is placed for any period in an obstet-
rical case is bound to exercise ordinary care to see that no 
unnecessary harm comes to her and each would be liable for 
failure in this regard. 
[10] !d.-Malpractice-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-\Vhere a plaintiff re-
ceives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of 
medical treatment, all those defendants who had any control 
over her body or the instrumentalities which might have caused 
the injuries may properly be called on to meet the inference 
of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct. 
[6f See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 295 et seq. 
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[11] !d.-Malpractice-Persons Liable.-A injured while 
unconscious on an operating table in a hospital can hold all or 
any of the persons who had any connection with the operation 
she cannot select the particular acts by the particular 
person which led to her disability. 
(12] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In order that a plaintiff be 
entitled to the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, he need 
not exclude every possibility that the injury was caused 
other than defendant's negligence. 
[13] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The 
conclusion that is the most likely explanation of an 
accident or injury is not for the trial court to draw or refuse 
to draw so as plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to 
permit the jury to draw the inference of negligence, though 
the court itself would not draw that inference; the court must 
still leave the question to the jury where reasonable men may 
differ as to the balance of probabilities. 
[14] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-To sub-
mit to the jury the question of res ipsa loquitur, the inference 
of negligence is not required to he exclusive or compelling; 
it is enough that the court cannot say that reasonable men 
could not draw it. 
[15] Physicians-Malpractice-Evidence.-In a malpractice case, 
plaintiff may make out a prima facie case through defendant's 
testimony. 
[16] Id.-Malpractice-Evidence.-In an action against an ob-
stetrician and an anesthesiologist for malpractice in alleged 
negligent administration of a spinal anesthetic hefore the birth 
of plaintiff's child, whether the obstetrician, who arrived in 
the delivery room after the spinal anesthetic had been com-
pleted, was negligent in failing to call in a neurosurgeon after 
discovering plaintiff's condition the following morning was a 
matter requiring expert opinion as to the standard practice in 
the community, as was whether such failure was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's condition or the cause of any aggravation 
thereof. 
[17] Hospitals-Actions-Evidence.-In an action against a hos-
pital and an anesthesiologist for malpractice in alleged negli-
gent administration of a spinal anesthetic before the birth of 
plaintiff's child, it was prejudicial error to sustain objections 
to questions asked the anesthesiologist and the administrator 
of defendant hospital which were relevant and material on the 
issue of agency, such as those bearing on the relationship exist-
ing between the two, the amount of control exercised by the 
hospital, and the extent of its right of control. 
[18] Agency-Questions of Fact.-Unless the evidence is suscepti-
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ble of but a single inference, the question of agency is one 
of fact for the jury. 
[19] Hospitals-Liabilities-Acts of Nurse or Physician.-A nurse 
or physician may be the servant of a hospital, thus requiring 
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, even 
though they are performing professional acts. 
[20] Agency-Ostensible Agency.-Before a recovery can be had 
against a principal for alleged acts of an ostensible agent, 
the person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in 
the agent's authority, such belief must be a reasonable one 
and must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal, 
and the third person in relying on the agent's apparent 
authority must not be guilty of negligence. 
[21] Hospitals - Actions - Questions for Jury. - In an action 
against a hospital and an anesthesiologist for malpractice in 
alleged negligent administration of a spinal anesthetic before 
the birth of plaintiff's child, evidence showing that the anesthe-
siologist was on defendant hospital's panel or staff, that he gave 
anesthetics for no other hospital, that all drugs and equipment 
used by him were supplied by such hospital, that he had 
regular "on call" duty at the hospital, and that a hospital 
nurse summoned him to give the anesthetic in question was 
sufficient to establish, prima facie, that he was an agent of 
defendant hospital, and the trial court erred in taking the 
issue of agency from the jury. 
[22] Physicians-Malpractice-Evidence-Opinion Evidence.-To 
qualify a witness as a medical expert it must be shown that he 
has the required professional knowledge, learning and skill 
of the subject of inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with 
authority thereon, and is familiar with the standards required 
of physicians under similar circumstances. 
[23] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Weight.-Where a witness has 
disclosed sufficient knowledge of a subject to entitle his opinion 
to go to the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge 
goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility. 
[24] !d.-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Experts.-The qual-
ification of an expert is ordinarily a matter addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse is shown. 
[25] !d.-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Experts.-The de-
terminative test as to whether the trial court properly exercised 
its discretion with respect to determining the qualifications of 
an expert is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowl-
edge on the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury. 
[26] Physicians-Malpractice-Evidence-Opinion Evidence. -In 
a malpractice obstetrical case the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in excluding the deposition of a physician who had been 
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licensed in California for over 30 years, who had been in 
private practice in New York, and who, in addition to teaching 
anatomy and histology in a university medical school, had 
treated men paralyzed because of injury to the spinal cord. 
[27] Evidence--Judicial Notice.-Surgery, together with its neces-
sity and effect, is in most instances not a matter of common 
knowledge. 
[28] Physicians-Malpractice-Pleading.-In an action against an 
obstetrician, an anesthesiologist and a hospital for malpractice 
in alleged negligent administration of a spinal anesthetic 
before the birth of plaintiff's child, an allegation that all 
defendants were negligent in regard to plaintiff's "medical 
care" is sufficient under the general rule of liberal construction 
to encompass plaintiff's claim that a laminectomy should have 
been performed. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Henry M. Willis, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action against an obstetrician, an anesthesiologist and a 
hospital for damages for malpractice. Judgment of nonsuit 
affirmed as to defendant obstetrician and reversed as to other 
defendants. 
Pollock & Pollock, Edward I. Pollock, David Pollock and 
William Jerome Pollock for Appellants. 
Hirson & Horn, Theodore A. Horn, Edward M. Raskin, 
Samuel A. Rosenthal, Leonard G. Ratner, Boccardo, Blum & 
Lull, Ashe & Pinney, Richard L. Oliver, Ben C. Cohen, 
Lionel Campbell, Rose, Klein & Marias, Elmer Low, Marion 
P. Betty, Eugene E. Sax and Myron L. Garon as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellants. 
Hunter & Liljestrom, Harold J. Hunter, De Forrest Horne, 
Reed & Kirtland and Henry E. Kappler for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs, Jessie and Jesus Seneris, husband 
and wife, appeal from judgments of nonsuit entered in favor 
of all three defendants, Dr. George S. Haas, Dr. James S. 
West, and Methodist Hospital of Southern California, in an 
action for damages for malpractice. 
On March 22, 1951, plaintiff Jessie Seneris, 37 years of age, 
and the mother of four children, was admitted to defendant 
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Methodist Hospital as a routine obstetrical case. Some nine-
teen hours after her admission, plaintiff was administered 
ether and other drugs which rendered her unconscious ( 618, 
619, Pl. Ex. 1). The record shows that defendant hospital, 
through one of its nurses, selected defendant Dr. West, one 
of a panel of six anesthesiologists, to administer a spinal 
anesthetic to Mrs. Seneris. Within approximately 12 minutes 
after the anesthetic was administered (Pl. Ex. 1) , plaintiff 
gave birth to a daughter. The delivery was spontaneous 
and uncomplicated. Plaintiff awakened the following morning 
and complained that ''she couldn't move her legs; that she 
had pain in her back, neck, head. arms and wrist.'' Plaintiff 
left the hospital five days after the birth of the baby, but 
returned for examination and X-rays. She was then given 
a back brace and crutches and later a leg brace. Within two 
or three months she regained the use of her right leg but at 
the time of the trial was still suffering pain in her left hip 
and had limited use only of her left leg. 
Plaintiffs brought this action on the theory that Dr. West 
was negligent in administering the spinal anesthetic; that 
Dr. Haas, the obstetrician, was liable in that he knowingly 
permitted Dr. West to administer the spinal anesthetic; and 
against the hospital on the theory that it was liable under 
the doctrine of respondeat surJerior. Plaintiffs contend that 
all three defendants are liable under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur; as joint venturers; and because they failed to call 
in a neurosurgeon and arrange for a laminectomy after dis-
covering the paralysis. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed error in 
granting nonsuits in favor of all three defendants in view of 
the evidence adduced; that error was committed in excluding 
the expert testimony of Dr. Webb, now deceased, offered by 
them in the field of anatomy, biology, pathology, histology and 
causation. (Dr. Webb's testimony was rejected on the ground 
that he did not qualify as an expert on the standard of care.) 
It is also contended that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is applicable under the facts here present. We are compelled 
to agree with these contentions. 
EVIDENCE 
The following sketch is taken from Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 
and is set forth to illustrate the testimony of defendant 
doctors on which plaintiffs rely to show that the motions 
for nonsuit were improperly granted: 
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KEY: T-thoraeie vertebra 
L-lumbar vertebra 
C-medullaris--conus medullaris 
*It is plaintiffs' position that the needle with which the spinal 
anesthetic was administered was inserted between T-12 and L-1 (at a 
spot, it will be noted, where the spinal cord is still present) ; defendant 
West's position is that the anesthetic was administered between L-4 
and L-5. 
In contending that the spinal cord was injured, plaintiffs 
rely on a hospital record (Pl. Ex. 2) which contained the 
following written report made by Dr. Nathan E. Carl, defend-
ant hospital's staff neurologist: ''The patient's [Mrs. Seneris] 
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subjective complaints are seemingly warranted on the basis of 
the positive neurological findings. There is sensory loss, 
motor weakness and reflex change in the left leg, indicating 
cord damage on the left in the lumbar region. Patient's 
responses are constant and are not indicative of functional dis-
order." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs argue that had the 
spinal anesthetic been administered in the position contended 
for by defendant West, no damage to the cord (as distin-
guished from the nerves) could have resulted since the cord 
is not present in that position. 
DR. HAAS TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS 
"Q. BY MR. PoLLACK [plaintiffs' counsel]: What is the 
next important thing to watch out for in the administration 
of a spinal anesthetic~ A. The place or location of the 
administration. 
"Q. Now, you are speaking of the various intervertebral 
interspaces that there are in the spine; is that correct 1 
A. That is correct. 
"Q. In connection with that, what is it that you have to 
watch out for with respect to where you insert the needle? 
A. In giving a spinal anesthetic, it is of utmost importance 
that you work in a region below the spinal cord itself. In 
administering a spinal anesthetic, a landmark on the pos-
terior of the patient's body is determined by drawing an 
imaginary line between the crest of the ilium of the patient 
that is to receive the spinal anesthetic. Below this line it 
is perfectly safe to work. 
"Q. And the reason for that, Doctor, is that the cord 
ends at the lower border of the first lumbar vertebra, usually Y 
A. That is correct. 
"Q. So, in inserting a needle into the spinal canal, the 
important thing to do is to make sure that you are below 
the end of the cord; is that right¥ A. That's right. 
'' Q. Why is it that you want to avoid the cord? A. The 
cord is a very delicate mechanism of the human body. It is 
an organ that we do not like to tamper with, one that is 
very, very sensitive. For that reason, it is naturally under-
standable that you would never work in that region where 
there is any possibility of working elsewhere. 
'' Q. So, if a needle, a spinal anesthetic needle, was being 
inserted into the spinal canal of a woman who was about 
to deliver a child, it would be bad practice, would it not, to 
go into a vertebral space above the first lumbar vertebra; is 
that correct¥ A. That is correct. 
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"Q. Now, next to [and above) the first lumbar vertebra, 
you have the 12th thoracic vertebra; is that correct~ A. That's 
right. 
'' Q. Actually, in general practice, you never go in above 
the second lumbar vertebra; is that correct? A. Yes.'' 
Dr. Haas also testified that when due care and proper 
practice was followed permanent paralysis did not follow. 
(100.) Dr. Haas' testimony also showed that Mrs. Seneris, 
having had one successful spinal anesthetic, was medically 
presumed to be non-allergic to such anesthesia. (101.) 
DR. WEsT 'l'ESTIFIED As FoLLOWs 
"However, if we put in a solution which is heavier than 
the relative weight of the spinal fluid solution, the spinal 
fluid, if it is heavier than that, it will tend, by gravity alone, 
to go downward. 
"Now, in this technique, one of the three items which 
is used in a solution of 10 per cent glucose, which increases 
the relative weight of the injected solution in relation to the 
spinal fluid, so that we are taking advantage of what we know 
to cause this solution to go down. 
"Now, in addition to that, the table upon which the patient 
is located is placed in a slightly tilted position so that we 
take advantage not only of the fact that the solution is 
heavier than the spinal fluid into which it is placed, but we 
also by the position of the table take advantage of this 
heavier solution, so that, once the solution is put into the 
subarachnoid space, it goes down.'' 
"Q .... Now, Doctor, ordinarily, when you are doing a 
spinal anesthetic, you like to insert the needle below this 
point here [indicating on Pl. Ex. 5] and I am pointing to 
the very tip of the conus medullaris; is that correct f A. Ordi-
narily, yes. 
"Q. And the reason for that is that you want to run no risk 
of running into the cord proper; isn't that correct? A. It is 
a matter of some safety, yes .... 
'' Q. If you enter opposite L-2, for example, you are below 
the cord? A. Yes. 
"Q. If you enter opposite L-1, the cord is there T A. The 
cord is still present, yes. . . . 
"Q. All right. Let's go to, say, T-12. What do you say 
about if you enter the spinal canal in the interspace between 
L-1 and T-12. Would you point that out on the map [Pl. 
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Ex. 5], the interspace between lumbar one and thoracic 
12 T • . • A. Into this space (indicating). 
"Q. Now, is there any danger there of coming in contact 
with the spinal cord~ A. Yes. 
'' Q. Isn't it for that reason that whenever you insert a 
needle in the spinal canal you try to stay below L-1? A. Yes. 
'' Q. Why is it that you do not want to strike the cord with 
your needle 1 A. Well, for the same reason that I have no 
desire to strike any nerve with a needle, specifically. 
'' Q. What is that reason? A. It may damage the nerve.'' 
In answer to the question : "Would trauma to the cord 
cause paralysis T'' Dr. West answered ''Yes.'' In answer to 
the question : ''Trauma to the cord or to the nerve roots below 
the conus medullaris would cause paralysis, would it not?'' 
Dr. West answered: "It is impossible to cause trauma to 
the cord below the conus medullaris." Dr. West testified as 
follows concerning his customary procedure in giving a spinal 
anesthetic: That when he first went into the delivery room, 
he told the nurse to turn the patient over on her right side; 
that he then opened his anesthetic tray; that he then put on 
sterile gloves; that there were four ampules of drugs on his 
tray-one of procaine, one of pontocaine solution, one of glu-
cose solution, and one of ephedrine solution; that he opened 
three of the ampules with a file across the narro\v neck of 
each; that he then drew a solution from each of three ampules 
into a syringe; that he then drew a solution from the fourth 
ampule into a smaller syringe; that he next applied a sterile 
solution to the patient's back; that he then placed a sterile 
drape sheet over the area just painted with the sterile solution; 
that "I then palpate the bony prominences for my land-
marks''; that ''I place my left hand on the patient's upper 
iliac crest [upper border of the hipbone] .... Then I drop 
my hand from this palpated bony crest into the midline of 
the back. . . . I [then] find that at this particular point my 
thumb is either in contact with the spinous process of lumbar 
4 or has actually fallen into the interspace between lumbar 
4 and 5. . . . At the space that I have located, keeping my 
thumb in the interspace, I raise a skin wheal. . . . The pur-
pose of that is to alleviate any discomfort on the part of tht> 
patient when the subsequent injection is made. . . . My skin 
wheal is now made. With my thumb still on this interspacE>, 
T pick up my spinal needle and make my approach to the 
dura." Dr. ·west then testified that the needle was hollow, 
that it had a stilet in it to keep it closed; that after the 
Dee.1955] SENERIS v. HAAS 
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subarachnoid space had been entered, the stilet was withdrawn; 
that then the syringe was attached to the needle; that then 
the "free flow of spinal fluid" from the needle was observed; 
that he "then pick[ed] up my syringe, which has at this 
moment a total volume of 3 cc 's in it. I dispose of 2 cc 's of the 
fluid" leaving 1 cc of volume in the syringe; that he then 
"attach[ed] it to the hub of the needle and withdraw [sic] 
1 cc of spinal fluid into the syringe ; that the syringe is then 
swirled to mix it, and the drug with spinal fluid in it is 
injected into the canal''; that the needle was then withdrawn 
and the anesthetic finished. 
[1] "A motion for nonsuit may properly be granted 
'. . . when, and only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, 
and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is 
legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate inference which 
may be drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination 
that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.' (Card v. Borns, 210 
Cal. 200, 202 [291 P. 190] ; see also Blumberg v. M. & T. Inc., 
34 Cal.2d 226, 229 [209 P.2d 1] ; Golceff v. Sugarman, 36 
Ca1.2d 152, 153 [222 P.2d 665].) [2] 'Unless it can be said 
as a matter of law, that ... no other reasonable conclusion 
is legally deducible from the evidence, and that any other 
holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support that a 
reviewing court would be impelled to reverse it upon appeal, 
or the trial court to set it aside as a matter of law, the trial 
court is not justified in taking the case from the jury.' 
(Estate of Lances, 216 Cal. 397, 400 [14 P.2d 768]; see also 
Raberv. Tumin, 36 Cal.2d 654,656 [226 P.2d 574].)" (Em-
phasis added; Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 95 [272 P.2d 
26] ; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 310 
[282 P.2d 12] .) 
SUMMARY 
A summary of plaintiffs' evidence shows that Mrs. Seneris 
entered the hospital in good health and suffering from none 
of the complaints and difficulties with which she awakened 
the day following the administration of the spinal anesthetic; 
that she had previously had a spinal anesthetic from which 
she suffered no ill effects and so was presumed, medically 
speaking, to be nonallergic thereto; that she had no disease 
or condition. which might have caused paralysis following 
a spinal anesthetic. The record also shows that defendant 
Haas testified that the place in the spine where the anesthetic 
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was to be administered was an "important thing" and of 
"utmost importance"; that it was "safe to work" below the 
end of the spinal cord; that it was "bad practice" to go 
into the spinal canal above the first lumbar vertebra; that 
the insertion of a needle above the first lumbar vertebra could 
cause cord damage; that in general practice a doctor never 
went in above the second lumbar vertebra. Dr. West testified 
that trauma to the cord would cause paralysis; that it would 
be ''impossible to cause trauma to the cord below the conus 
medullaris''; that it was his opinion that plaintiff's (spinal) 
nerve roots had been affected by the anesthetic solution used 
by him. Plaintiffs introduced in evidence hospital records 
which showed that Dr. West arrived in the hospital delivery 
room at 9 p. m. and that two minutes later, at 9 :02 p. m., the 
spinal anesthetic was completely administered. Dr. West's 
testimony shows the various steps, in chronological order, 
taken in administering such an anesthetic. Plaintiffs showed 
that Dr. West did not wash his hands prior to administering 
the anesthetic to Mrs. Seneris. Plaintiffs introduced in evi-
dence the written report of Dr. Nathan E. Carl, defendant 
hospital's staff neurologist, wherein he stated that Mrs. Se-
neris' condition "indicat [ ed] cord damage on the left in the 
lumbar region." (Emphasis added.) 
[3a] Plaintiffs contend that evidence shows that the spinal 
anesthetic was hurriedly and negligently administered and 
that it was the proximate cause of Mrs. Seneris' injuries. 
Defendant West contends that there is nothing* in the record 
to show that plaintiff wife's injuries were caused by the 
anesthetic. This contention is disproved by the testimony of 
Dr. Haas himself when he testified: "Q. BY MR. POLLACK: 
Doctor, I want to know, in the case of Mrs. Seneris, what is 
your opinion as to the level of the nerve roots, this damage 
or injury to the-well, it is all mixed up. Let me try it once 
more. What I am trying to get at is this: The nerve roots 
(to be distinguished from the spinal cord) have been affected, 
you say, by the anesthetic solution that you used; is that 
correct? 
''A. I think so. It is my opinion, yes.'' (Emphasis added.) 
Dr. West later testified that "I should say that the nerve 
roots have been affected below the level of my injection.'' 
He had previously testified that the solution he used was 
*Aside from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which will be discussed 
later, 
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''weighted'' and the table tilted so as to be sure the fluid 
would ''go down.'' 
From this evidence, it could have been legitimately 
inferred by the jury that plaintiff Seneris' injuries were 
proximately caused from spinal cord damage caused by a 
spinal anesthetic administered between the twelfth thoracic 
and the first lumbar vertebrae; that a spinal anesthetic admin-
istered in that location was not good medical practice, or the 
exercise of that care and caution expected of a practicing 
physician in that community. [ 4] .A. defendant's conduct 
must always be gauged in relation to all the other material 
circumstances surrounding it, and if such other circumstances 
admit of a reasonable doubt as to whether such questioned con-
duct falls within or without the bounds of ordinary care then 
such doubt must be resolved as a matter of fact rather than 
of law. (Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Ca1.2d 213, 21'1 
[157 P.2d 372, 158 .A..L.R. 872] ; Toschi v. Christian, 24 Ca1.2d 
354, 360 [149 P.2d 848] ; Estate of Lances, 216 Cal. 397, 400 
[14 P.2d 768]; Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal.2d 654, 656 [226 P.2d 
574]; Palmquist v. Mercer, supra, 43 Cal.2d 92, 95; Warner v. 
Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 310 [282 P.2d 12] .) 
[3b] It follows, therefore, that the trial court erred in grant-
ing a judgment of nonsuit as to defendant West. 
APPLICABILITY OF THE DocTRINE oF REs IPSA LoQUITUR 
[5a] Defendants contend that the heretofore quoted testi-
mony elicited from defendant doctors is not sufficient, without 
applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, to permit plaintiffs 
to go to the jury. We are of the opinion that the evidence 
is sufficient, but we are also of the opinion that the jury, under 
appropriate instructions, should have been permitted to deter-
mine whether each of the conditions necessary to bring into 
play the rule of res ipsa loquitur were present (Roberts 
v. Bank of America, 97 Cal..A.pp.2d 133, 137 [217 P.2d 129]). 
[6] Plaintiffs and defendants agree that the conditions to be 
met before the doctrine may be applied are that the accident, 
or injury, must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur 
in the absence of someone 's negligence; that it must be caused 
by an agency or instrumentality in the control of the defend-
ant; and that it must not have been due to any voluntary 
action or contribution on the part of plaintiff. (Ybarra v. 
Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258]; 
Baker v. B. F. Goodrick Co., 115 Cal..A.pp.2d 221, 226 (252 P. 
2d 24); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 687 
[268 P.2d 1041).) 
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Plaintiffs argue that it is a matter of common knowledge 
that a woman does not ordinarily become permanently para-
lyzed following childbirth after having had a spinal anesthetic 
administered as an incident thereto; that Dr. Haas testified 
that ''ordinarily where due care [was] used and proper 
practice followed, permanent paralysis [did] not follow''; 
that Dr. West testified that he had never had a case of perma-
nent paralysis due to sensitivity to a spinal anesthetic; that 
he had made four or five thousand spinal punctures ; that 
Dr. Carl's written report shows that it was his opinion that 
plaintiff's injuries were due to spinal cord damage; that 
spinal cord damage could be caused by a spinal anesthetic 
needle being inserted above the first lumbar vertebra; that 
it was most important that the spinal anesthetic be admin-
istered in a location below the conus medullaris, or the end 
of the spinal cord; that Dr. West had completed the adminis-
tration of the spinal anesthetic within two minutes of the time 
of his arrival in the delivery room; that the anesthetic was 
administered by him without having ''scrubbed.'' 
Defendant West argues that paralysis may result from a 
number of causes other than negligence in giving a spinal 
anesthetic; that in a certain percentage of cases paralysis will 
result from spinal anesthesia without any negligence; that 
plaintiffs introduced no proof that the practice used by him 
in administering the anesthetic was not the desirable or 
standard practice; that it is of "no importance" that he did 
not scrub since he used sterile gloves; that plaintiffs introduced 
no proof that the spinal anesthetic fluid was ever injected in 
Mrs. Seneris' spinal canal. 
[7] We said in Zentz v. Coca Cola BoWing Co., 39 Cal.2d 
436, 442 [247 P.2d 344], so far as the first requirement is 
concerned-that the accident, or injury, must be of a kind 
which "ordinarily" or "probably" does not happen in the 
absence of negligence and that "In the LaPorte case, 33 
Cal.2d at page 169 [199 P.2d 665], we said, after assuming 
that defendants were in control at the time of the accident, 
that 'the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
depends on whether it can be said, in the light of common 
experience, that the accident was more likely than not the 
result of their [defendants '1 negligence. [Citations.] "Where 
no such balance of probabilities in favor of negligence can 
be found, res ipsa loquitur does not apply." ' In deter-
mining whether such a probability exists with regard to a 
particular occurrence, the courts have relied both upon com-
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mon knowledge and the of witnesses. (See 
for example, Cavero v. Franklin etc. Benev. 36 Cal.2d 
301, 309 [223 P.2d 471] ; Escola v. Coca Cola Co., 24 
Cal.2d 453, 459, 460 [150 P.2d 436] ; Juchert v. California 
Water Service Co., 16 Cal.2d 500, 515 [106 P.2d 886]; Judson 
v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 561 P. 48 Am.St. 
Hep. 29 hR.A. 718] .) " 
[8] We also said in Zentz v. Coca Cola Co., gupra, 
39 Cal.2d 436, that ''Another factor which some of the 
cases have considered in applying the doctrine is that the 
defendant may have superior knowledge of what occurred and 
that the chief evidence of the cause of the accident may be 
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the plaintiff. 
(See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 490 [154 P.2d 687. 
162 A.L.R. 1258]; Mudrick v. Market Street Ry. Co., 11 Cal.2d 
724, 731-732 [81 P.2d 950, 118 A.L.R. 533] ; Anderson v. 
I. ltl. Jameson Corp., 7 Cal.2d 60, 64 [59 P.2d 962]; Smith v. 
O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 722 [12 P.2d 933] ; Kenney v. 
Antonetti, 211 Cal. 336, 339 [295 P. 341] ; Connor v. Atchison, 
etc. Ry. Co., 189 Cal. 1, 5 [207 P. 378, 22 A.L.R. 1462]; 
O'Connor v. Mennie, 169 Cal. 217, 225-226 [146 P. 674]; 
Steele v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 168 Cal. 375, 378-379 [143 
P. 718] ; Hottsel v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 167 Cal. 245, 249-250 
[139 P. 73, Ann.Cas. 1915C 665, 51 L.R.A.N.S. 1105] ; Wyatt 
v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 156 CaL 170, 174 [103 P. 892] .... ) " 
This factor is peculiarly applicable, as well as neces-
sary, in the type of situation we have here-where a patient 
suffers injury while unconscious and in the care and custody 
of the defendant, or defendants. 
It would appear that plaintiffs have made out a prima 
facie case by both medical testimony and common knowl-
edge that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Seneris are not 
such as usually occur in the circumstances without negligence 
on the part of someone. Defendant \Vest's assertions to the 
contrary are matters for the finders of the facts. 
Apparently Mrs. Seneris was unconscious at the time the 
spinal anesthetic was administered. Defendant West contends 
that her condition could have been caused by a number of 
causes other than negligence in giving the anesthetic. There 
is no doubt that when Mrs. Seneris went to the delivery room 
she was in good health. [9] We said in Ybarra v. Span-
gard, 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1058], that 
''Every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed 






W e also said in Sttrnmers v. 
P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d , that 
''. . . a while unconscious on an operating 
could hold all or any of the persons who 
had any connection with the even though he could 
not select the acts person which 
led to his We said too that the effect of the 
decision in the Ybarra case was that plaintiff had made out a 
case when he had evidence which gave rise to an 
inference of negligence which was the proximate cause of the 
injury; that it vvas then up to the defendants to explain the 
cause of the injury. [12] In order that a plaintiff be entitled 
to the benefit of the doctrine of res loquitur, he need not 
exclude every other that the injury was caused 
other than by defendant's negligence (Prosser, Res Ipsa 
Loquitur in 37 Cal.L.Rev. 183, 197-198). 
Defendant vVest argues that Mrs. Seneris has not met the 
third condition-that the must not have been due to 
any voluntary action or contribution on her part. This argu-
ment stems from the testimony of one of plaintiff wife's 
doctors that she suffered from a "psychic overlay factor" 
(a type of hysteria induced by emotional disturbance) ; and 
from Dr. West's assertion that Mrs. Seneris may have had a 
"sensitivity" to the anesthetic solution of which it was said 
the paralysis might have been a result. Plaintiffs proved 
that Mrs. Scneris had had an uneventful spinal 
anesthetic; and by expert testimony of Dr. Haas that she was 
presumed, medically speaking, nonallergic to spinal anesthesia. 
Plaintiffs also proved that Mrs. Seneris, at the time of her 
admission to the hospital, was a strong and healthy woman ; 
that she suffered from no disease in which a spinal anesthetic 
would be contra-indicated. 
[5b] In Baker v. B. F. Goodr'ich Co., 115 Cal.App.2d 
221, 229 [252 P.2d 24], it was said: "Where the evidenc0 
is conflicting or to diff0rent inferences, it is for the 
jury, under proper instructions, to determine whether each 
of the conditions necessary to into play the rule of res 
differ as to 
California, 
inference of 
or compelling one. 
that reasonable men could not 
Cal.App.2d 448 P.2d 
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or injury, is 
to refuse to draw so long 
evidence to the jury 
even the court 
; the court must still 
where reasonable men may 
Loquitur in 
[14] The 
of the conditions upon which the 
is to be predicated is a of fact and the right of the 
jury to find those facts must be carefully (Black v. 
Partridge, 115 Cal.App.2d 646 [252 P.2d 760]; Rose v. 
ilf.elocly Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481 [247 P.2d 335]; Knell v. Morris, 
39 Cal.2d 450 [247 P.2d ; lJ1il1:cts v. Wheeler Ilosptial, 109 
Cal.App.2d 759 [241 P.2d 684].) We conclude, there-
fore, that plaintifl's' eYidence is sufficient to submit to the 
jury, under proper instructions, the of the rule 
of res ipsa loquitur. Defendants contend that the case of 
Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal.2d 216 [88 P.2d 695], is con-
trolling concerning the application of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur to the case at bar. While the two cases may be 
distinguished on their facts, we do not deem it necessary to 
do so here as we have concluded that the doctrine is applicable 
to the factual situation disclosed by the record in this case 
and any expression in the Engelking case which may be 
contrary to this conclusion is hereby disapproved. 
Defendants' reliance upon the rule set forth in the case of 
:1yers v. Parry (New .Jersey), 192 F.2d 181, is misplaced. 
There, plaintiff suffered following a spinal anesthetic 
administered between the second and third lumbar vertebrae. 
Plaintiff had been brought into the hospital acutely ill with 
an infection and with a temperature of 103.6°. An emergency 
operation was found necessary to alleviate an obstruction to 
the common bile duct. Expert testimony showed there that 
plaintiff's condition was known as a cauda equinal neuritis 
produced by the spinal anesthesia; that certain nerve roots 
SEl'<ERIS [45 C.2d 
aninflam-
eonstrich; and damages 
the nerves, ... and which occurs due to some unusual re-
action on the part of the patient to that st;lution." The court 
held that the doctrine of res ipsa was not available to 
the plaintiff under the circumstances. Whether or not we 
agree with the holding in the New ease, it is apparent 
from further language of that court that the case is easily 
distinguishable from the one under consideration. The court 
said: "vVhen the expert testimony otiered by the plaintiff 
ascribes the cause to the toxic quality of the injected drug as 
distinguished from the negligence of the anesthetist. that evi-
dence is binding upon the court and the jury would not be 
permitted to speculate to the contrary.'' rrhe court also said: 
"Nor is the doctrine available in a case based upon want of 
skill in diagnosis, method or manner of treatment. Here, the 
process of treating the nerve roots by a drug to produce 
anesthesia in an operation to remove an obstruction to the 
common duct certainly technical knowledge and skill. 
Because the unfortunate eonsequences suffered by plaintiff 
in themselves do not as a matter of cornrnon knowledge and 
experience reveal lack of skill in the anesthetist, scientific opin-
ion is clearly necessary to throw light on the subject." (Em-
phasis added.) In the case under consideration, plaintiffs 
proved, through the testimony of defendant doctors, that Mrs. 
Seneris' injuries were not such as usually happened when due 
care and proper practice were observed. [15] In a mal-
practice case, plaintiff may make out a prima facie case 
through the testimony of the defendant (Lawless v. Calaway, 
24 Cal.2d 81, 90 [147 P.2d 604] ; Anderson v. Stump, 42 Cal. 
App.2d 761, 765 [109 P.2d 1027]). 
EviDENCE As IT RELATES TO DR. HAAs 
[16] Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Haas is also liable for 
Mrs. Seneris' injuries in that he knowingly permitted Dr. 
West to administer the anesthetic negligently; in that he 
failed to call in a neurosurgeon or other consultant; in that he 
failed to arrange for a laminectomy to be performed on Mrs. 
Seneris; and under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The record shows that Dr. Haas had made arrangements 
for Mrs. Sencris to have a spinal anesthetic at the time of her 
delivery; that he had not arranged for Dr. West to give it. 
'rhe record further shows that Dr. Haas testified that when he 
arrived in the delivery room he did not know whether Mrs. 
Seneris was conscious or not; that Dr. West was standing 
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by the patient's side removing the rubber ''that he 
uses when he his spinal''; that at the time of his entry 
into the delivery room Mrs. Seneris was on her back 
and a nurse was putting her legs into the stirrups preparatory 
to the spontaneous delivery of the child. It is obvious from 
this evidence that the spinal anesthetic had been completed 
by Dr. \iV est prior to Dr. Haas' arrival in the delivery room. 
Defendant Haas contends that whether or not he was negli-
gent in failing to call in a neurosurgeon after discovering Mrs. 
Seneris' condition the following morning was a matter requir-
ing expert opinion as to the standard practice in the commu-
nity and that plaintiffs produced no such expert opinion. 
It is also argued that plaintiffs produced no evidence to show 
that such a failure was in any way the proximate cause of 
plaintiff Seneris' injuries or the cause of any aggravation 
thereof. These contentions appear to be meritorious. Whether 
Dr. Haas' failure to call in a neurosurgeon to examine Mrs. 
Seneris the following day constituted negligence depended 
upon expert testimony as to what an ordinarily skilled physi-
cian practicing in that vicinity, in the exercise of due care 
and professional judgment, would have done under the cir-
c-umstances. (Bickford v. Lawson, 27 Cal.App.2d 416, 421-
422 [81 P.2d 216].) Plaintiffs' further contentions with re-
spect to Dr. Haas fail for the same reason: that no expert 
evidence was produced to show that Dr. Haas' failure to call 
in a neurologist in any way contributed to Mrs. Seneris' 
condition. 
EviDENCE As TO DEFENDANT HosPITAL 
Plaintiffs' first contention is that defendant hospital is 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the neg-
ligence of Dr. West in administering the spinal anesthetic to 
Mrs. Seneris. 
Mr. Hoefflin, administrator of defendant hospital, testified 
as follows concerning the relationship between the hospital 
and Dr. West: That Dr. West was one of six anesthesiologists 
on the hospital staff; that these anesthetists were appointed 
by the board of directors of the hospital after having been 
approved and selected by the members of the medical staff 
(composed of doctors) ; that the six anesthetists constituted 
the medical staff of the Department of Anesthesiology ''and 
their services were available to the members of the staff. 
Uniquely, they had an agreement among themselves in order 
to provide good anesthesia coverage to cover the hospital 
830 
as I recall, basis one night 
themselves in six as and another person 
on second call and third down the which 
meant that one man would be in the hospi-
tal after he finished his anesthesia work in the regular 
scheduled hours in order that any emergency surgery that 
came into the hospital any obstetrical case would have 
anesthesia coverage there''; that the anesthetists are under 
the control of the medical staff; that no member of the board 
of directors has to with them; that the anesthe-
tist himself billed the for the anesthetic given by him ; 
that the hospital furnish0d to the anesthetist the medications 
given, he supplies, white clothes, 
gloves, telephone service and a to rest; that the 
anesthetist was required to make a written report on each 
anesthetic given. Mr. Hoefflin further testified that if an 
anesthetist was found to be the medical execu-
tive committee, as governing board of the medical staff, 
recommended to the board of directors of the hospital that 
action be taken. 
Dr. West testified that he gave anesthetics at no hospital 
other than defendant hospital; that he had no office of his 
own but took calls at his home; that it was common practice 
for him to be summoned a nurse at defendant hospital 
to administer an anesthetic to an obstetrical case; that one 
of the nurses on the obstetrical floor notified him to give the 
anesthetic to Mrs. Seneris. Dr. West testified that he did not 
see Dr. Haas until after he had finished administering the 
spinal anesthetic to Mrs. Seneris. Dr. West explained the call 
system to mean that when he had ''first'' call, he would give 
all the anesthetics necessary; that if he happened to be giving 
an anesthetic when another was the anesthesiologist 
on ''second'' call would give that one; that if he were not 
busy giving an anesthetic, he would give them all. Dr. West 
testified that after Mrs. Seneris' difficulties arose he wrote 
a ''document'' of which he had copies made; that he presented 
one copy to the administrator of the ; that this was 
not required and was a report other than the usual and 
required anesthetic report to the hospital. 
[17] Plaintiffs assign as prejudicial error numerous ques-
tions asked of Dr. West and Mr. Hoeffiin to which objections 
were sustained. Plaintiffs contend that these questions were 
relevant and material on the issue of agency and, it appears 
Dec. 
agc)_nt, three 
v. Citizens Nat. Tntsi & 
P.2d ) '[First] The 
do so with belief in the 
must be a reasonable one; 
some act or neglect 
and the third 
issue of agency convinces us that 
enumerated in the Hill 
case. did nothing to 
put respondent on notice laboratory was not 
an integral part of and it cannot serious-
ly be contended that he was being carried 
from room to room pain, should have 
inquired whether the individnRI \loctors who examined him 
were employees of the college or were independent contractors. 
Agency is always a question of fact for the jury." 
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was one 
or staff; that he gave anesthetics 
that all drugs and used by 
said hospital; that he had regular ''on 
call'' ; that a hospital nurse summoned 
him to give the anesthetic in question. It appears that this 
evidence is sufficient to that defendan 
West was an agent of defendant hospital. 'fhere is nothing 
in the record to show that plaintiffs should have been on 
notice that defendant West was not an employee of defendant 
and it can not be "seriously contended" that she was 
obliged to inquire whether each person who attended her in 
;.;aid hospital was an employee or an independent contractor. 
It follows that the trial court erred in taking the issue of 
agency from the jury. 
ExcLUSION OF ExPERT TESTIMONY OFFERED BY PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed an abuse 
of discretion and prejudicial error in excluding in its entirety 
the testimony taken by way of deposition of Dr. Frank 
Webb, now deceased. Dr. Webb's testimony was offered for 
the bearing it would have on anatomy, pathology, histology 
and causation as involved in the case at bar. Dr. ·webb's 
testimony was not offered as expert evidence on the proper 
and requisite degree of skill and care used by practicing 
physicians in the community. (See Huffman v. Lindquist, 
37 Cal.2d 465, 478 [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 485], where 
Dr. Webb's testimony was held properly excluded when offered 
to show tbe required standard of care.) 
Dr. \Vebb 's testimony was offered to show the location 
and cause of Mrs. Seneris' paralysis; that her injury was trau-
matic and mechanical in nature; the means by which the 
injury occurred; that the anesthetic needle had been inserted 
in the area opposite the twelfth thoracic and first lumbar 
vertebrae; that the spinal cord had been punctured and the 
cord injured by the anesthetic fiuid. 
Among Dr. \Vebb 's many qualifications as an expert in 
the anatomical field, and as to the cause of plaintiff wife's 
injuries, we note that he had seen about 1,000 spinal cords; 
had examined from 100 to 150 eases involving injury to the 
spinal cord with resulting paralysis; that in autopsies he had 
examined the spinal cord to determine the location of an 
injury thereto; that he had examined the spinal cord both 
knowledge, 
sufficient to 
ject, and (2) is familiar with 
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cians under v. 
525, 532 33 CaL2d 749, 753 
f205 P.2d C.,J.S. 261, § 537.) 
[23] Where a witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of 
the subject to to the jury, the 
question of the goes more to the 
\Yeight of the evidence ( Clmtd v. 
Jfarket Street 74 100 168 P.2c1191] ; 
10 Cal.Jur. 963; 2 3d ed., 641; 31 
C.J.S. 99-101.) of an expert is ordi-
narily a matter addressed to discretion of the trial 
court, and its will not be disturbed on unless · · 
a clear abuse is shown. 83 Cal2d 749, 753 
[205 P.2d 3, 8 A.L.R.2d , 53 Cal. 
App.2d 103, 114 P.2d The determinative 
test as to whether the trial court exercised its dis-
cretion is whether the witness disclosed sufficient knowl-
edge of the to go to the jury. 
(Valdez v. 35 492 [96 P.2d 142]; 
Hutter v. 213 Cal. 677, 681 [3 P.2d ; Pierce v. 
Paterson, 50 491 [123 P.2d 544] ; Mirich v. 
Balsinger, 53 115, 118 f127 P.2d 639]; 32 
c .• J.s. 261, § 537.)" 
[26] In addition to the 
forth, Dr. Webb was a 
California since 1920. 
New York; had been 
where he had treated mon 
spinal cord. Dr. Webb had also 
45 C.M--2'1 
and surgeon licensed in 
been in private practice in 
railroad employees hospital 
because of injury to the 
anatomy and histology 
C.2d 
m Southern California medical school as 
dental Dr. \Y d1b had been autopsy 
surgeon for the county of Los Angeles for over 30 years 
to his death. 
It appears to us that the trial court clearly abused its 
Dr. \v ebb's and "effectively 
denied a fair opportunity to prove her case." (Ag-
Los Angeles, snpra, 97 Cal.App.2d 557, 568.) 
OTHER CoN'l'ENTIONS 
Plaintiffs charge all defendants with negligence in hav-
failed to perform, or have performed, a laminectomy 
upon l'v1rs. Seneris after her injuries were discovered. Plain-
tiffs produced no expert evidence that a laminectomy \Vas indi-
cated in a ease such as the one under consideration other 
than an affirmative answer by Dr. West to a statement made 
by plaintiffs' counsel that a laminectomy (a sort of picture 
window in the backbone) is indicated where there has been 
cord damage. Plaintiffs produced no expert testimony that 
such an operation would have alleviated l\Irs. Seneris' condi-
tion. [27] Surgery and the necessity therefor, and effect 
thereof, is in most instances not a matter of common knowl-
edge. 
[28] Defendants contend that plaintiffs' pleading was not 
sufficiently broad to encompass their claim that a laminectomy 
should have been performed. \Ve do not agree. Plaintiffs 
alleged that all defendants were negligent in regard to her 
''medical care.'' 'l'he pleading is sufficient under the gen-
ual rule of liberal construction. (Greninger v. Fischer, 81 
Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [184 P.2d 694].) 
It may be that on a retrial plaintiffs may be able to show 
by expert medical testimony that such surgery was not only 
indicated but would have been performed as standard medical 
procedure in the community. 
The judgment of nonsuit as to defendant Haas is affirmed 
and as to all other defendants it is reversed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred, 
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
The petition of respondent Dr. West for a rehearing was 
denied January 18, 1956. 
